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Monitoring the quality of dialysis care has long been a
component of the Medicare ESRD program. As part of the
2008 Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act
(MIPPA), Congress mandated the Quality Incentive Program
(QIP), which linked measures of care quality to payments. The
legislation embraced the idea that this linkage of federal
money to performance would encourage the purchase of
greater ‘value.’ The first 2 program years for the QIP use a
simple scoring methodology and a limited scope of quality
metrics. For payment year 2014 (performance period
calendar year 2012), the program changes substantially, with
an expanded number of quality measures and a more
complex scoring methodology. In this article, we describe the
program structure, quality measures, scoring system, and
financial impact.
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BACKGROUND
The Medicare and Medicaid Programs, managed through the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), has been
consistently clear in its intent to increasingly move from a
passive payer for health care to a partner that works with
providers to ensure the quality of care received by program
beneficiaries.1 The CMS seeks to attain the triple aim of
better health care for individuals, better care for populations
and communities, and lower costs2 through care improve-
ment. In the End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) realm, the
involvement of CMS in this regard has been long-standing. In
recent years, the relationship has become progressively more
engaged, first with the public reporting of ESRD quality data3
and, more recently, with the ESRD Quality Incentive
Program (QIP). This program is a requirement of section
1881(h) of the Social Security Act and, remarkably, is one of
the first national pay for performance programs of any type.
For payment years 2012 and 2013 (performance years
2010 and 2011), the ESRD QIP is quite simple, based only on
anemia and dialysis adequacy measures. For the payment
year 2013 (performance 2011), quality is measured simply
as the percentage of patients with a urea reduction ratio
(URR) of X65% and those with a hemoglobin (Hgb) level
of 412 g/dl. Payments can be reduced up to a maximum
of 2% for failure to achieve acceptable results compared with
either national averages or the program’s own previous
performance.
PAYMENT YEAR 2014 (PERFORMANCE PERIOD 2012)
The ESRD QIP changes significantly in payment year 2014.
The two major areas of change are (1) a larger spectrum and
number of quality measures and (2) a more advanced, and
complex, scoring methodology. We will begin by discussing
individual measures with a focus on the scientific merits of
each indicator. There are three clinical quality measures,
which together account for 90% of the performance score,
and three reporting measures, which comprise the remaining
10% of the performance score.
CLINICAL MEASURES
(1) Percentage of erythropoietin-stimulating agent (ESA)–-
treated patients with Hgb 412 g/dl. The higher the
percentage, the lower the score for this measure (see
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Figure 1 for national changes in Hgb concentrations over
time). There are key exclusions, for which we refer the
reader to the final program rule.1
(2) Percentage of patients with the URR ofX65%. The CMS
had proposed changing the dialysis adequacy measure to
KT/V, but in the final rule reverted to the URR measure
owing to lack of standardization for KT/V.
(3) Vascular access type. This measure comprises the
percentage of hemodialysis patients using an arteriove-
nous fistula (AVF) with two needles during the last
treatment of the month and the percentage of hemodia-
lysis patients with an intravenous catheter in use for 90
days before the last dialysis session, with no AVF or
arteriovenous graft (AVG). Although access type at
initiation of dialysis is not counted in the measure,
because most US hemodialysis patients initiate treatment
via a catheter,4 success with this measure requires timely
removal of the catheter (Figure 2).
The CMS had proposed adding two additional clinical
measures, vascular access infections and the standardized
hospitalization ratio, but chose in the final rule to postpone
inclusion of both indicators.
REPORTING MEASURES
(1) The first reporting measure is based on the dialysis
facility’s reporting dialysis safety events to the CDC
National Healthcare Safety Network.
(2) The second is the attestation that patient satisfaction is
assessed by the In-Center Hemodialysis (ICH) Consumer
Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems
(CAHPS) survey.
(3) The final measure is the attestation that serum calcium
and phosphorus are measured on at least a monthly
basis.
SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR THE MEASURES
Can the measurement of performance improve medical
quality of care? To achieve this goal, Chassin et al.5 have
suggested four key principles derived from previous studies
that proposed that quality measures should be vetted against:
(1) ‘y a measure must be based on a strong foundation of
research showing that the process addressed by the
measure, when performed correctly, leads to improved
clinical outcomes.’
(2) ‘the measurement strategy must accurately capture
whether the evidence-based care has been delivered.’
(3) ‘the measure should address a process quite proximate to
the desired outcome, with relatively few intervening
processes.’
(4) ‘the measure should have minimal or no unintended
adverse consequences.’
The QIP clinical quality measures should be tested against
these criteria.
(1) Percentage of patients with Hgb412 g/dl (the higher the
percentage, the lower the score for this measure). The
evidence to support this measure comes from a series of
randomized controlled trials comparing lower with near-
normal Hgb targets. These studies have consistently
found adverse outcomes, predominantly cardiovascular
and atherothrombotic events when a Hgb target of
413 g/dl is maintained for an extended period, generally
several years.6–8 It is important to note that the CMS
hemoglobin quality measure assesses potentially transi-
ent increases in Hgb, and not extended targeting.
According to the methodology used for the measure,
the actual Hgb value used in the determination of
whether a patient exceeded 12 g/dl or not is the mean
value of all eligible claims (minimum 4 claims) submitted
during the year. Therefore, in its most literal interpreta-
tion, the Hgb measure violates Chassin principle 1. No
RCT (randomized clinical trial) has specifically sought to
answer the question of whether transient increases in
Hgb to 412 g/dl (or any Hgb level) are harmful to
patients. There are some limited observational data,9 but
it can only be concluded that there is no definitive
answer to this question. We would suggest that the FDA
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Figure 1 | From the United States Renal Data System (USRDS)
2011 Annual Data Report. The distribution of patients with
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Figure 2 | From the United States Renal Data System (USRDS)
2011 Annual Data Report. At the initiation of hemodialysis,
the majority of patients use a dialysis catheter as access at their
first dialysis treatment. AV, arteriovenous.
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when Hgb approaches 11 g/dl, is sufficient for addressing
potential risk.10 Indeed, Figure 1 shows that clinical
practice has already changed in the direction intended by
the FDA. As such, the measure focusing on elevated
hemoglobin only provides indirect information regard-
ing prescribing patterns (Chassin principle 2), does not
reflect that intercurrent illness, iron deficiency, and/or
repletion can alter the relationship between ESA dose
and hemoglobin (principle 3), and could have adverse
consequences (principle 4) if it is established that the
necessarily lower hemoglobins that are incentivized by
this scheme do not in fact yield better outcomes.
(2) The percentage of patients with the URR of X65%
measures dialysis adequacy. The scientific evidence would
seem sufficient to support this indicator; the Kidney
Disease Outcomes Quality Initiative guidelines state that
the minimally acceptable URR is 65%, with strength of
evidence assessed as A.11 The measure would appear to
meet the other Chassin criteria as well, making this an
appropriate quality indicator. One concern is the problem
of noncompliant patients who sign off treatments early.
Although it could be argued that part of the facility’s
responsibility for quality is to ensure compliance, the
extent to which noncompliance with treatment length is
fully manageable is unclear. As expressed in terms of
quality measures principle 3, an inadequate URR does
not always reflect circumstances under facility control,
and the quality targets imposed on a facility ideally
should accommodate that reality.
(3) The vascular access type clinical indicator averages two
subindicators, the use of AV fistulas and the use of
dialysis catheters, both measured in patient-months vs.
exposure. The individual indicators are both endorsed by
the National Quality Forum (NQF). The scientific
evidence here is clearly strong.11,12 One concern could
be a violation of Chassin criterion 4, ‘the measure should
have minimal or no unintended adverse consequences.’ A
quality indicator that promotes fistulas and penalizes
catheters seems reasonable. However, by not including
AV grafts as a measure, this indicator could result in
attempts to place AV fistulas in inappropriate candidates,
which could result in unnecessary discomfort, complica-
tions, and increased costs. Neither the vascular access
type indicator nor any of the other measures should
deter individualization of therapy when appropriate, and
this may be accommodated by selecting appropriate
benchmarks for performance comparison or permitting
clearly defined adjustments for outliers.
Previously, there had been another quality measure—the
percentage of patients with Hgbo10 g/dl. This was removed
with the 2013 payment year. There is a fair body of evidence
to suggest that avoidance of Hgb concentrations below 10 g/
dl could improve patient outcomes. Among published RCTs,
it has been demonstrated that transfusions are reduced13 and
that quality of life probably improves14,15 with Hgb levels
above 10 g/dl (the FDA did not permit such a QOL statement
in the ESA labeling, however). This needs to be balanced
against a consistent finding of increased cardiovascular risk
when the Hgb target is maintained at 413 g/dl.6–8 If one is
satisfied that the safety risks when targeting Hgb levels
413 g/dl do not extend significantly below 12–13 g/dl, then
the balance of risk and benefit supports maintaining the Hgb
level above 10 g/dl. This would suggest that a clinical quality
indicator measuring the percentage of patients with an Hgb
level 410 g/dl should be reinstated.
The QIP reporting measures are generally simpler and
somewhat exploratory, and contribute only 10% to the Total
Performance Score (TPS). Although Section 1881(h)(2)(B)(i)
of the Social Security Act generally requires a contracted
consensus-based entity’s endorsement of measures (a role
played by the National Quality Forum (NQF, see below)), it
allows certain exceptions ‘in the case of a specified area or
medical topic determined appropriate by the Secretary for
which a feasible and practical measure has not been endorsed
by the entity with a contract under section 1890(a).’ The
reporting measures may be most relevant as an indication of
future QIP full weight measures. Caution is certainly
warranted here as none of these indicators could be
reformulated in an evidence-based manner. For future years,
the CMS would do well to eliminate reporting measures and
embrace measures that reflect quality in a more direct manner.
Although the Chassin criteria serve as an excellent
construct for objective determination of the value of quality
measures, NQF endorsement is the statutory requirement for
measure inclusion in the QIP. For this reason, it is valuable to
understand the NQF methodology. The NQF is a nonprofit
organization with widespread membership among health-
care providers and payers. The Chassin criteria are not
significantly different from the NQF process for measure
endorsement. The NQF also uses four criteria: (1) measures
should be in high-priority areas, (2) scientific acceptability,
(3) usability and relevance, and (4) feasibility of collection.
The NQF does not explicitly characterize the linkage between
a quality measure and the improvement process and how
confounding factors are to be mitigated.
QUALITY INCENTIVE PROGRAM SCORING SYSTEM
A TPS (range of 0–100) is generated from the total of the
individual clinical indicators (90%) and reporting measures
(10%). The scoring of clinical indicators is more complex
and will be discussed first (Figure 3).
Each of the three clinical indicators receives an achieve-
ment score (range of 0–10) and an improvement score (range
of 0–9). The higher of the two becomes the performance score
for that indicator. The achievement score is calculated based
on the facility’s performance in 2012. This is compared with
national performance during the baseline period, 1 July
2010–30 June 2011. The range of 0–10 is created by setting a
‘floor,’ the achievement threshold, at the 15th percentile of
national performance. Facility performance below this level
would result in zero achievement points earned. To achieve
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the maximal 10 points, the facility would need to perform at
or above the national 90th percentile during the baseline
period, termed the benchmark. Facility performance between
the achievement threshold (0 points) and benchmark (10
points) results in an intermediate score. For example, it is
estimated that the achievement threshold for the percentage
of patients with a URR X65% will be 91%, and that the
benchmark will be 100%. This highlights an important
problem with the program’s selection of metrics, i.e., the
URR measure is ‘topped out’ by this methodology. If the
achievement score is already generally excellent, why select
this metric? Its existence seems to serve the purpose of
affording an opportunity for CMS to pay less instead of
incentivizing good performance. This is because performance
below the 100% level will lose points and result in a possible
financial penalty. With the achievement threshold for URR
X65% at 91% and the benchmark of 100%, a facility with
88% of its patients above a URR of 65% would receive zero
points for achievement. If 100% of its patients were above
65% then the score would be 10, and if 96% of its patients
were above 65% then the score would be B6.
The facility improvement score (range of 0–9) for each
clinical indicator is intended to give credit for progress made
on quality performance. To continue the example from
above, if the facility described had 96% of its patients with
URRX65% during the performance period (2012) and 92%
during the baseline period, and the national benchmark was
100%, then the improvement score would be 5. Because the
higher of the achievement or improvement scores becomes
the performance score for that clinical indicator, the dialysis
adequacy performance score would be 6.
The reporting measures account for 10% of the TPS.
(1) Reporting of safety events (infections) to the CDC’s
National Healthcare Safety Network results in 5 points
for simply enrolling and training in the program, and the
maximum 10 points for 3 months of reporting.
(2) Attestation that patient satisfaction is being measured
with the ICH CAHPS tool earns 10 points.
(3) Attestation that calcium and phosphorus are tested at
least monthly earns 10 points.
TOTAL PERFORMANCE SCORE AND PAYMENT
The TPS determines the amount of payment reduction. It
comprises 90% of the clinical indicator scores and 10% of the
reporting scores. Each of the three clinical scores (0–10)
multiplied by 3 yields a summed clinical indicator score of
0–90. Similarly, the three reporting scores multiplied by 0.33
will add to a sum of 0–10. Together, the TPS can therefore
have a final score of 0–100.
Payment can be reduced from 0 to 2% based on the TPS.
The CMS has decided that it will base payment on a national
minimum TPS. The current estimate is that the minimum
TPS will be set at or about 56. Every 10 points the facility TPS
scoring falls below this level will result in another 0.5%
payment reduction (Table 1).
The financial impact can be approximated by considering
total facility Medicare revenues. If a facility has 100 patients
and performs 15,600 eligible Medicare treatments per year,
and the average payment per treatment is $235, then annual
revenues would be $3,666,000. If the TPS is below 26, then
2% of payments, or $73,320, would be lost. We would argue
that this financial risk is too small to have a meaningful
impact on quality. The Medicare Hospital Inpatient Value
Based Purchasing Program (VBP)16 also has a capped
payment risk of 2% (reached in 2017). This program,
however, has an interesting financial twist. The 2% is
withheld from payments, and then paid back later based on
performance. More importantly, it is a zero sum game—that
is to say that the amount paid back to the hospital could be
substantially more than the 2% initially withheld. It is likely
that the VBP program could have a greater impact on quality.
On the other hand, the results of the QIP will be public
information, and in this regard facilities may be motivated to
achieve the performance inherent in the metrics in order to
buttress their reputation as providers of quality care.
In conclusion, the ESRD Quality Incentive Program is
intended to incent consistently high-quality care for dialysis
patients. The 2014 payment year program reflects substantial
changes in methodology. Going forward, we would suggest
that to the greatest extent possible all future quality measures
should be NQF certified and tested against the Chassin
criteria. Finally, we would recommend that the system
should not simply be punitive, but, similar to the Hospital
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Figure 3 |Dialysis facility percent patients with urea reduction
ratio of (URR) X65%, 92% in baseline period, 96% in the
performance period, achievement score of 6, improvement
score of 5; higher of the two, 6, is the URR final performance
score.
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VBP program, should provide the opportunity to increase
payment for excellent performance.
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